What does Daos teach us about the future of leadership

Table

Summary/Zusammenfassung

Publications

Recognition

1. Chapter: Introduction

1. Introduction

   1.1 Overview of nature guarantee

   1.2 Review of the thesis

Chapter 2: Background

2.1 Block Chains and Smart Contracts

2.2 The rules for setting the importance of transactions

2.3 Setting of transaction priorities and transparency of dispute

2.4 Decentralized Management

2.5 Chip Chain Scales with layer 2.0 solutions

Chapter 3. The order of the order of the importance of transactions

3. The order of the order of the importance of transactions

   3.1 methodology

   3.2 Analyzing the following norm

   3.3 Investigating the offenses of the norm

   3.4 Dark Defense Transactions

   3.5 Summary notes

Chapter 4. Setting of transaction priorities and transparency of dispute

4. Setting of transaction priorities and transparency of dispute

   4.1 methodology

   4.2 on the transparency of the application

   4.3 of the transparency of a priority

   4.4 Summaries

Chapter 5. Decentralized management

5. Decentralized management

   5.1 Methodology

   5.2 Leadership attacks

   5.3 Compound Management

   5.4 Summary notes

Chapter 6. Related to work

6.1 The rules for setting the importance of transactions

6.2 Setting of transaction priorities and transparency of dispute

6.3 Decentralized Management

Chapter 7. Discussion, restrictions and future work

7.1 Ordering a transaction

7.2 Transparency of the transaction

7.3 Vote Distribution to change smart contracts

Conclusion

Extras

Appendix A: Further analysis of transaction priorities standards

Annex B: Additional analysis of transaction priorities and transparency of dispute

Annex C: Further analysis of voting force distribution

Bibliography

6.3 Decentralized Management

There is a rich literature on decentralized management and social contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DOOS) and chain management protocols. Below we look at the previous efforts, which are the most important for this thesis.

6.3.1 Decentralized Management and Social Agreements

Previous work has been studying a chip -based (decentralized) control potential for centralization in traditional applications and services. Atzori et al. For example, the extent to which chip -based management could be centralized and hierarchical social structures and authorities can be alleviated or replaced (Atzori, 2017). Reijers et al. He studied the relationship between the chart chain management and social contract theory (Reijers et al., 2016). They analyzed the political consequences of blockchain technology and how it follows or deviate from philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes, 1651), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Rousseau, 1920) and John Rawls (Chapman, 1971). Chen and others. compromised between decentralization and performance (Chen et al., 2021). Arruñada and Garicano proposed new forms of “soft” decentralized leadership to overcome traditional centralized control structures (Arruñada and Garicano, 2018). Zwitter and Hazenberg conducted a comprehensive overview of leadership theory and proposed the concept of the concept of governance of Dao (Zwitter and Hazenberg, 2020). These precedes provide valuable information on decentralized management structures, although they do not confirm, to what extent their (theoretical) observations are valid in real -time application

6.3.2 Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DaOS)

In several earlier studies, DOOS was analyzed (Beck et al., 2018; Hassan and De Filipp, 2021; Rikken et al., 2019). Hassan and De Filippi analyzed what Daos forms and discussed their main features (Hassan and De Filipp, 2021). Rikken et al. Determined various political challenges in the control of the chip circuits (Rikken et al., 2019). Beck and others. (Beck et al., 2018) Dao presented case analysis in Swarm City (City, 2023), which is a decentralized trade platform. The recent work was classified by several chip circuits, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tezos, Polkadot and some control protocols, such as Uniswap (Adams et al., 2021), Makerdao (Makerdao, 2023) and compound (Leshner and Hayes, 2019), 2023 (Kiaias and Lazos). However, these priceless previous work does not study empirically existing Dao data to describe how users interact with the chain management government with smart contracts.

Three works are closely related to us (Feiccher et al., 2023; Fritsch et al., 2022; Sharma et al., 2023). Their findings agree to ours, eg, they also found a high concentration of a symbolic delegation among the small number of users. Similarly, they showed that the largest owners of the symbols are more active in voting, further exacerbating the problem of centralizing. Although they analyzed the voting holding and the cost of voting more than 10 daos, our study presents a thorough and comprehensive analysis focused on the compound. Specifically, our analysis shows the full life cycle of the proposals, highlighting how voting behavior develops over time for various proposals. We also explore in detail the symbolic property rights that concentrate on units, as well as how delegations (by individual units) affect the concentration of chips. Finally, we discover huge inequalities among the owners of the signs and provide its impact on decentralized management.